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HOW CAN WE CREATE THE OPTIMUM ENVIRONMENT FOR

CONTINUED AIR SURVEILLANCE OF CUBA?

1. Assumptions.

a. Purpose. That we intend to insist on procedures which,
(1) because of their technical sufficiency, verify to our reasonable satisfaction the absence of offensive weapons systems in Cuba and,
(2) because of Soviet-Cuban awareness of the procedures, deter both reintroduction of those systems and introduction of other objectionable military capabilities in Cuba.

b. Available means. That we have the capability to perform photographic flights at any level, from very low to very high, but that we do not have the capability to do any significant portion of the task by way of oblique photography obtained from outside Cuban territory.

c. Possible costs. That there are weapons in Cuba capable of shooting down our aircraft, so there is a risk that we shall lose some pilots and planes; and that overflights of Cuban territory without Cuban consent may have negative political implications.

2. Surveillance requirements. The surveillance requirements for the future depend on developments over the next few days and weeks. In this paragraph are two illustrative alternatives. The first assumes that the "offensive weapons systems" have been removed and that the surveillance requirements are fairly light. The second assumes that the situation is in doubt and that the surveillance requirements are fairly heavy. Both sets of requirements lead to the same conclusions as to how best to create the optimum climate for continued surveillance. But, obviously, the heavier overflight schedule--especially because it calls for much more frequent low-level flights--is a much more difficult set of conditions for which to prepare a favorable climate.

a. Light schedule. Complete high-level coverage of Cuba once a month and occasional low-level surveillance of specific locations which intelligence indicates are suspicious. The high-level surveillance requirement probably can be fulfilled by six U-2 flights

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a month (unless weather is particularly bad during the relevant period). The low-level surveillance requirement will depend upon the extent to which there is reliable on-site ground inspection and upon the extent to which suspicious locations are indicated by intelligence. In any event, to preserve the "easement" for use when it is needed, there will be a minimum requirement of one low-level flight approximately every two weeks.

b. Heavy schedule. High-level flights sufficient to provide complete coverage of Cuba and the Isle of Pines once a week. This requires overflights by two or three aircraft each day (to produce approximately 12,000 feet of film total a day) in order to overcome weather problems, to make reasonable use of aircraft and to spread out the load on film processors and photo-interpreters. Low-level flights sufficient to provide higher-resolution coverage of specific designated areas. This, if the degree of suspicion was high, would require six to eight planes (flying in pairs) flying a total of three or four missions a day. Unless refueling arrangements (for the F-101) are made, distant low-level missions must use Guantanamo.

3. Optimum environment. The optimum environment for continuing US overflights is one in which two conditions are met: (a) The aircraft are able to complete their missions without physical interference, and (b) the political price of our behavior is low.

4. Tools available. We have two tools which we can use to contribute to the desired environment:

a. "Debate." The US can produce UN and OAS resolutions, press releases and inspired columns, speeches and statements by the President and other key people, and direct words to the Soviet representatives in the New York negotiations and elsewhere. Guidance can be issued at all US representatives everywhere in this connection.

b. Physical conduct. The US can conduct itself with respect to Cuban overflights in such a way as to communicate confidence and resolve while at the same time avoiding unnecessarily provocative incidents.

5. Debate. In the area of "debate," our position so far has been good.

a. Past.

The communique issued at the termination of an informal meeting of the OAS on October 3 acknowledged that the United States has been conducting surveillance of the build-up of weapons in Cuba. The communique stated that "The meeting observed that it is desirable to

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intensify surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items of strategic importance to the Communist regime in Cuba in order to prevent the secret accumulation in the Island of arms that can be used for offensive purposes against the Hemisphere."

The President in his October 22 address to the nation stated, "Upon receiving the first preliminary hard information of this nature last Tuesday morning at 9:00 a.m., I directed that our surveillance be stepped up." And, his second "initial step" was "I have directed the continued and increased close surveillance of Cuba and its military build-up. The Foreign Ministers of the OAS, in their communique of October 6 (3?) rejected secrecy on such matters in this hemisphere . . ."

The release to the leaders of the world on October 22 and to the public a day or two later of the pictures taken of Cuba were probably the most influential single element in the dramatic support obtained for the US Quarantine. This role of the photographs will not soon be forgotten.

The resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System on October 23 resolves ". . . To recommend that the member states in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the continent . . ."

Our public statements since October 22 and 23 have been consistent with the above declared position. So have our statements to the Soviets and to the UN. To the Soviets we have in the negotiations in New York repeatedly referred to the knowledge gained from our aerial surveillance, even while negotiations were proceeding. See, e.g., USUN 1606 of November 2, in which reference was made to our opinion that no documentary agreement was required regarding aerial surveillance. The point was raised specifically by Mr. Gilpatric (see USUN 1660) on November 7, to be rejected by the Soviets, of course. The point has also been made to U Thant (see, e.g., USUN 1535 of October 29).

b. Present and Future. The guidelines for the present and future should be as follows, and US representatives should be instructed to follow these guidelines:

1. Justification. The continuation of overflights is justified for two reasons: (1) The Soviets agreed (according to the President's

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October 27 letter) to "adequate arrangements through the United Nations to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments" and to "adequate safeguards." The Soviets have not come through. Unilateral US "arrangements" must therefore suffice. (2) The duplicity, speed and seriousness of the Soviet-Cuban conduct prior to mid-October were such that the United States, for its own defense and for the defense of the Hemisphere, must take steps to see that such a thing does not happen again.

ii. Harmlessness. The flights will be conducted in a totally harmless way and in as unobtrusive a manner as possible. The U-2s will not be visible to the naked eye. The low-flying aircraft will be noisy but probably infrequent and, in any event, they will be instructed to avoid Cuban cities unless the cities are themselves the objects of the surveillance. Any devices used to provide light for night flights may make some noise, but will be harmless.

iii. Invulnerability. The high-flying aircraft are, for practical purposes, immune from destruction by non-Soviet anti-aircraft weapons. The U-2s are vulnerable only to destruction by Soviet SA-2s (which are deployed in Cuba). There should be a quiet "assumption" that the Soviets, while not expressly signing on to our conduct, will condone it by keeping the SAMs silent. No reference should be made to the invulnerability of low-flying aircraft.

iv. Resoluteness. It should be made perfectly clear that aerial surveillance of Cuba, providing complete coverage, is going to continue until an adequate international substitute (aerial, ground or both) is provided. The continuation of aerial surveillance is not open to negotiation. We will not tolerate interference. We were almost burned once; not again.

v. UN presence in Cuba. The United States is for the establishment of UN presence in Cuba and for the creation of a UN aerial surveillance capability. Furthermore, the United States, for its part, is willing to permit relevant portions of the United States to be subjected to such UN presence or surveillance. Such a UN presence or surveillance capability will not eliminate the requirement for unilateral US aerial surveillance, however, unless the UN achieves a good deal better capability than we anticipate.

vi. Relation to anti-invasion pledge. The promised US anti-invasion pledge is of course conditioned on the creation of suitable arrangements to safeguard us against the reinstitution of offensive weapons in Cuba. Unhindered aerial surveillance is an essential prerequisite to the anti-invasion pledge.

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vii. Propriety. Aerial surveillance is reasonable and harmless (as indicated in paras i. and ii. above). Furthermore, it was authorized by the Organ of Consultation on October 23, and is therefore legal and right. Further, more specific action, by the OAS would be desirable, but we should not risk losing the unanimous (though vague) OAS authority we already have.

6. Physical conduct. Probably the most convincing "messages" will not be those which we utter in words, but those which we communicate by deeds. The following courses of conduct are suggested:

i. Regularity. Acceptability of US overflights is much more likely (1) if we move in small steps from our present heavy schedule of daily overflights to the contemplated light schedule of overflights no more frequent than perhaps once a week, and (2), if whatever is the level of effort we lay on, we schedule the overflights on more-or-less regular intervals.

ii. Obtrusiveness. Fly in an "open" but unobtrusive manner. It is common that one creates a "right" to do something by continued practice. But it is elementary that his "right" is not nearly as good if he has behaved secretly. Therefore, the US should walk the fine line in our overflight practice--we want to be "open" enough to have our practice "notorious," but unobtrusive enough to avoid violent Cuban-Soviet interference. The U-2s are unobtrusive; they fly too high to be seen by human eye; their presence will in fact be known to the Cubans and Soviets, however, and we would be acknowledging their presence in Cuban skies. The low-level aircraft cannot operate in a totally unobtrusive way. They can however take courses which avoid populated areas unless the populated area is the photo-target. (As a capability to take pictures from outside the 12-mile limit is developed, flights of that kind should be employed to the extent feasible.)

iii. Persistence. Disregard harassing MIGs and the lighting up of "fruit set" radars. Continue on course until mission is completed. If a plane is shot down, pursue the tactics suggested in Mr. Nitzze's draft memorandum to the President (see also the suggestions of the Joint Chiefs in JCSM-872-62 of November 7.)

iv. Jammer. Query whether jammers (if they are available) should be used. This because it reveals concern about possible Soviet-Cuban anti-aircraft action. Such concern is inconsistent with our claim of legality and right. (Also, use of a jammer might disclose some of our military secrets.)

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v. Disclosure of results. Consistent with the theory that our surveillance activities are entirely proper, pictures obtained should be made available to the OAS and to the UN on occasions. Over time, of course, this may be counterproductive, since such repeated "good conduct" reports may undercut our "right" to (need for) surveillance. On the other hand the taking and disclosure of the pictures can be construed as a protection of Cuba against invasion--the absence of justification for invasion is repeatedly demonstrated.

7. Further action. Further thought must go into this attempt to create "acceptability" for aerial surveillance.

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